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1 The choice between organizations and markets
In "The Role of Organizations in an Economy"1 Herbert Simon focuses on a number of
issues which are crucial for clarification of the relationships between economic and
organizational theory. In particular he gives a new perspective on what has become a classical
question of economic theory: can the firm and the market be regarded as two alternative forms
of the organization of economic activity?
The entire question stems from Coase’s celebrated article "The Nature of the Firm"
written in 1936, in which he compares firm and market and suggests that they are two
economic institutions that perform the same task - the coordination of decisions taken by
various individuals - in different ways. As in the market, so within the firm dispersed
knowledge and different skills are coordinated. Within the firm, Coase notes, coordination
takes place through orders and control, in markets through the price system.
In the following pages I will discuss some of the problems arising from Simon’s lecture,
which, in relation to the New Institutionalist’s’ interpretation of the problem, offer us a very
different and illuminating perspective on the relationship between market and organizations.
In his lecture, Simon observes that a key point in analizing the Coase’s intuition is to
decide what meaning is to be attributed to the term ’coordination’. We may therefore
conveniently begin by examining what common aspects and what differences can be found
between coordination by markets (which comes about through competition) and coordination
"by managers" within a firm.
It is widely known that analysis of coordination by the market has developed in different
versions within the neoclassical school: from Smith’s "invisible hand" to Walrasian
"tatonnement", to von Hayek’s "competition as a procedure for discovery of the new", to
                                                
1
 Mattioli Lectures 1994 . The arguments are partially contained in Simon (1991) and (1993)
2mention only some. This is not the place to review these various versions; nevertheless it
should be pointed out that, despite their differences of emphasis, all schools agree over the
fact that coordination is a process by which different plans decided independently by different
individuals becomes mutually compatible.
A further feature is ascribed to the coordination process: namely that it is a learning
procedure by means of which equilibrium prices are "discovered". This feature, which has
been emphasised in particular by the Austrian school, is nevertheless also present in the
Walrasian formulation. In Walras’ analysis, in fact, coordination takes place through
WDWRQQHPHQW the auctioneer receives all information concerning demand excess and issues all
information concerning prices. The interaction between auctioneer and agent can be interpeted
as a process of collective learning which enables economic agents to discover the equilibrium:
that is, the parameter values by which their plans become mutually compatible. Interestingly,
this type of learning cannot be assimilated to the process of individual rational choice; on the
contrary, it is a multi-actor cooperative process in which the part played by each agent is
extremely limited, and the final result is achieved without the individual agent being aware of
it; that is, the agent does QRWengage in an individual search for equilibrium prices. This is the
third essential feature of coordination.
We may therefore sum up the argument so far by saying that the coordination performed
by competition has three important properties:
1. different plans of separate individuals, drawn up independently and rationally,
become mutually compatible;
2. the economic system "discovers" the correct parameter values, i.e. the equilibrium
prices, which enable coordination to take place;
3. The discovery process is one in which agents are unaware.
Hence, albeit in embryonic form, coordination is interpreted as a OHDUQLQJ SURFHGXUH
realized through competition.
Let us now turn to the coordination that takes place within economic organizations. Is
this process, as Coase suggests, analogous to coordination carried out by the LQYLVLEOHKDQG?
Can we consider it to be a competitive process which coordinates the plans of separate
individuals through a system of orders and thus induces individuals unwittingly to reach some
kind of "internal organizational equilibrium"?
Let us inspect the differences between the two cases. For the first characteristic above to
be respected ( the mutual compatibility of plans), one must assume that agents within
organizations - here employees and managers - take their decisions and formulate their plans
entirely independently of one another, like the agents in a Walrasian atomistic economy. That
they do QRW behave in this way is a well-established fact.
Thus the description of the coordination process provided by the Walrasian model
cannot be realistically extended "inside the black box" without introducing substantial
modifications into the most important features that Walras attributed to individual planning.
Instead of trying to define these modifications, as an alternative research strategy we
should examine if there exists an organizational set up which provides individuals with all
relevant information, as the in the Walrasian picture of "tatonnement".
A model of this kind must have the following features: first, the tasks of the individuals
within the organization must be perfectly identified and rigidly separated, as in the tayloristic
caricature of the organizational machine; second, individuals (employees and managers) must
decide and realize their plans following a general plan issued by a central coordinator.
Only under these conditions can we avoid the unrealistic assumption that individuals are
able to perform very complex calculations without costs, because all the computational effort
is undertaken by the central coordinator.
3 This picture of planning, which transfers the Walrasian framework within organization,
was provided by Barone at the beginning of the century, when he showed that the Minister of
planning in a collectivist society can issue appropriate orders and perfectly govern the
economy on the basis of the same principles as the Walrasian general equilibrium model
(Barone, 1908).
Agents in this case send information and receive orders via the central coordinator,
which, in turn, receives information and send orders. The main problem arising from this
model is explaining how it is possible for the central coordinator to obtain and process all
relevant information. In fact, whereas the Walrasian auctioneer issues "orders" simply by
altering the prices on the basis of the aggregate excess demand, the tasks to be performed by
Minister of Planning are more complex: he must transmit the correct order to every producer.
Consequently he must have detailed knowledge of the economic system and his evolution
over the time. It was the Austrian School in the 1930s (von Wiese, von Mises and von Hayek
in particular) that first addressed this question and denied the possibility of central planning in
a collectivist society. Even if we may not fully agree with this position, it is be very difficult to
admit that such hyper-centralized system would be able to adapt to external changing
circumstances: individuals in this context would mechanically execute the orders, without any
autonomous capacity to decide or to plan. A business organization based on this kind of rigid
and centralized planning would lack in endogenous mechanisms of reaction, and therefore
would be unable to change and to survive on a competitive market .
In consequence, a key problem is to understand if, beyond the mechanism of centralized
planning, it is possible to model different coordination mechanisms characterized by different
degrees of decentralization; and what level of individual knowledge, information processing
and planning capacity they require. To move in that direction we must make more realistic
assumptions about the individual planning activity, and revise the traditional opinions on the
independence and rationality of decisions.
As a first assumption, it is necessary to take into account that individual plans are
formulated in a strategic context, i.e. that they depend on the plans implemented by other
individuals; therefore the higher the decentralization of the coordination mechanism the
greater is the amount of computation required of individuals to evaluate DOO the consequences
of their decisions.
Second, and more important, we must acknowledge that within organizations the
separation of knowledge and skills among employees is not total; nor can it be among firms.
This viewpoint seems related to Simon’s opinion, where he points out that
"... neoclassical theory assumes that there are clear boundaries between the elements
known as firms. In practice these boundaries are highly ambiguous.....Markets represent only
a part, if an important part, of the channels of communication and coordination between
organizations".
Indeed, the production of knowledge and information within a firm is not based on a
rigid separation of skills and knowledge among economic agents, as happens in the Walrasian
market. On the contrary, an organization is usually based on close interaction among its
components, on the joint use of competencies, and on the exploitation of the positive
externalities which arise from interactions. Within organizations, individuals exchange
information and orders, as Coase suggests, but they also exchange knowledge and alter their
competences and skills.
This is a crucial difference from Walrasian assumptions, and suggest us to distinguish
between "static" and "dynamic" planning.
4The former takes place when individual planning does not involve any change into the
organizational shape, as in Walras and Barone’s accounts. (A more or less centralized
coordinating mechanism can render different individual plans reciprocally compatible, by
means of orders and information channels.)
The latter takes place when individual plans modify the organizational shape;
coordination in this eventuality can be assimilated to a (deliberate, conscious or unconscious)
process of organizational design.
 The two features I have emphasized - interdependency of individual plans and
overlapping competences among individuals - suggest that, to find an explanation of the
relationship between economic organizations and individual behaviours, we must move
beyond the limits of the Walrasian approach.
2 Bounded Rationality, Coordination and Learning: from Hayek to Simon
Hayek went to the root of the problem of the relationship between individual rationality
and the role of the market by incorporating it into the more general problem of the role of
knowledge in society, and by examining the nature of economic institutions.
His point of departure was a critique of the manner in which the general equilibrium
model had traditionally been interpreted. The model assumed the consumer preferences as
"given" and all the technologies as freely available.
In his Presidential Address of 10 November 1936 at the London Economic Club, Hayek
contested this aspect of the model. He pointed out that, although technologies and preferences
are indeed the givens of the problem, they are unknown to the majority of economic agents:
they constitute idiosyncratic, specific, personal information and knowledge whose acquisition
by economic agents would require unlimited capacities of memory and calculation.
Under the (Walrasian) hypothesis that agents have consistent preferences sets, know all
available technologies, and possess an unlimited capacity for calculation and memorization,
they may be able to make fully rational decisions. By removing these unrealistic assumptions,
and emphasizing that knowledge is diffused heterogeneously and asymmetrically among
individuals Hayek implicitely assumed that the rational and cognitive capacities of the
individual are limited. He can be considered a precursor of Simon’s bounded human
rationality approach, because his major hidden premise to the explanation of why economic
institutions exist is that individual have limited capacities and competences.
 In restating this point, Simon notes that it is precisely because individuals are incapable
of handling all the relevant knowledge and information necessary for rational decision-making
that economic institutions exist. He maintains that knowledge is efficiently accumulated and
transmitted by institutions, which fulfil tasks which are beyond the individual capacities. The
role of the institutions is therefore paramount: they gather knowledge and information in such
a way as to reduce the uncertainty of human action and broadly extend its range.
Note that it is not only realistic but logically consistent to assume that no single actor is
able to possess a complete and accurate picture of all relevant information and knowledge;
should such an actor exist, this would annul the necessity itself of the economic institutions
(and particularly of the market). A lucid restatement of this point, as part of a critique of the
theory of rational expectations, is to be found in Arrow (1978).
 Hayek attributes a broader role to competition than was envisaged by the Walrasian
model. In a number of celebrated passages he describes competition as a process of discovery
of the new; a process whereby individuals obtain the specific information they need to
formulate and implement their plans. The central point, in his view, is that the economic
5institutions reflect the way in which the division of labour and knowledge among the different
individuals in society has come about, and they guarantee its coordination.
".... I still believe that, by what is implicit in its reasoning, economics has come nearer
than any other social science to an answer to that central question of all social sciences: How
can the combinations of fragments of knowledge existing in different minds bring about
results which, if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge on the
part of the directing mind which no single person can possess? To show that in this sense the
spontaneous actions of individuals will, under conditions which we can define, bring about a
distribution of resources which can be understood as if it were made according to a single
plan, although nobody has planned it, seems to me an answer to the problems which has
sometimes been metaphorically described as that of the "social mind". (Hayek, 1980, p. 54)
According to Hayek, the market is a non-constituted institution. Like language and
money, economic institutions are not born of a fully intentional and rational collective
decision; nor they are the outcome of a project generated by the mind of a social architect.
They are - in his view- the historical and unintentional product of the consolidation of inter-
individual relationships. However, Hayek does not address the problem of how institutions
emerge, or how "spontaneous" institutions and artificial institutions, i.e. those created by
conscious human design, can coexist and interact.
 But do completely artificial institutions actually exist? And if they do, in what relation
do they stand with "natural" ones? Hayek considered socialist planning to be the limiting case
of artificial structures, in direct contrast to the natural mechanism of competition. Much of his
work was devoted to demonstration of the impossibility of economic planning, or better to his
contention that planning is not an institutional instrument able to replace the market
effectively - the planner, unlike the market, is unable to gather all the information and
knowledge required to reach an optimum solution.
But, as Coase remarked one year later Hayek’ Presidential Address, planning is the
characteristic feature of any business organization, and therefore at least up to a certain point
planning activity is expected to be efficient.
 2UJDQL]DWLRQV, the pioneering book written in 1958 by March and Simon, proposes a
different and richer view, where hierarchical planning and designing - which typically are
sciences of the artificial - and individual "spontaneous" decisions are interrelated.
Before developing this point, I conclude the discussion about the Walrasian framework
by suggesting that the appropriate context to compare market and organization as alternative
cooperation devices, is not the Walrasian one, but, more promisingly, the Hayekian one.
The reason for the failure of attempts to apply the Walrasian framework directly to what
happens within organizations therefore seems now clear: the Walrasian model assume a world
in which the division of labour is given; there is a complete separation of skills and
knowledge among economic agents, and the creation or transfer of knowledge and skills is
assumed to be either impossible or costless. The previous discussion suggests that
coordination requires a more complex explanation, which takes account of the capacity to
innovate and learn of individuals and organizations, in a context related to limited rationality
and knowledge sharing. Hayek, and later Schumpeter, assume a world in which the creation of
knowledge is the fundamental process underlying coordination activities and more generally
economic change. But they did not provide clear theoretical microfoundations on which to
model economic change. With bounded rationality theory Simon give us the first important
step in that direction. It is therefore convenient to turn to the problem of knowledge
acquisition and creation, along the lines of Simon’s approach, to evaluate the potentialities of
these assumptions in explaining the nature of cooperation within organizations.
63 Organizational learning: microeconomic aspects.
The idea that the learning activity plays a central role in human decision making derives
from the pioneering work of Cyert, Simon, March and Newell. In 1956, in a path-breaking
article which constituted a first crucial step in analyzing rationality within organizations,
Cyert, Simon and Trow carried out an empirical analysis of managerial decisions which
revealed an evident "dualism" of behaviour:
"Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which the
decision-making process is programmed. At one extreme we have repetitive, well defined
problems (e.g., quality control or production lot-size problems) involving tangible
considerations, to which the economic models that call for finding the best among a set of
pre-established alternatives can be applied rather literally. In contrast to these highly
programmed and usually rather detailed decisions are problems of non-repetitive sort, often
involving basic long-range questions about the whole strategy of the firm or some part if it,
arising initially in a highly unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the kinds of search
processes listed above." (Cyert, Simon and Trow, 1956, p.238)
March and Simon (1958) note that in conditions well-structured from the cognitive and
decisional viewpoint, subjects learn to solve problems, achieve a stable behavioural patterns
of actions or, if one wishes, their behaviour becomes URXWLQL]HG. The sequence of choices
confronted by individuals performing an organizational task constitutes a repetitive SURFHGXUH
which becomes familiar to those executing it, and presents well-defined alternatives codified
according to the variants arising from changing external circumstances.
Most of the human activity within economic organizations takes the form of this
procedural and routinized behaviour. Within the organization, we can consider as URXWLQH any
procedure which provides for the execution of a specific task; it is therefore a procedure
which solves a set of problems internal to the organization. A procedure can be described as a
set of instructions determining the actions to be taken when dealing with a particular
circumstance.
It seems natural, therefore, to model a procedure as a SURJUDP, in the specific sense
given to the term by computation theory, as a list of instructions in an artificial language. This
enables us to represent procedures formally and to model SURFHGXUDOUDWLRQDOLW\ (March and
Simon, 1958, chap. 6).
If individuals are able automatically to replicate repeated sequences of decisions
deriving from their interactions with others, the role of routines becomes clear: they enable
individuals to save on "rational computation" and radically reduce the complexity of
individual decisions. In consequence a part of everyday decisions becomes to some extent
"automatic" and therefore possibly tacit. More precise exploration of this point has been
conducted by Nelson and Winter, on the basis of the methodological principles enunciated by
M. Polanyi in 3HUVRQDO.QRZOHGJH (1958). They emphasize that some behavioural sequences
consist of actions which are partially tacit; this feature leads the two authors to the problem of
how tacit knowledge is formed, transferred and stored in memory.
 This is a starting point for exploring how cognitive skills, which arise through
experience and cooperation, are stored in the memory and by consequence become building
blocks for subjects who have to solve problems. Pursuing this line of research, Cohen and
Bacdayan (1991) suggest that routines are stored as SURFHGXUDOmemory. Following Squire’s
(1987) distinction between procedural and declarative memory, they claim that
" SURFHGXUDO memory appears to be the form that stores the components of individual
skilled actions - for both motor and cognitive skills. It is distinguished from GHFODUDWLYH
memory, which provides the storage of facts, propositions, and events. " (1991, p. 5).
7Cohen and Bacdayan use a laboratory experiment to analyze the emergence of
procedural behaviour by two subjects involved in a game which requires coordination and
cooperation, and its "sedimentation" in memory. The general point at issue here is how the
acquisition, and memorization of cognitive skills takes place, and how its transfer is possible,
i.e. how skills can be re-used. As Singley and Anderson show (1989), the range of transfer of
procedurally encoded skills is very restricted. By consequence, learning requires effort and
time, and the transmission of cognitive skills is at least partially opaque.
Moreover, routines memorization is highly local and incomplete, and it therefore pre-
supposes the human capacity to FRPSOHWHPLVVLQJ NQRZOHGJH. This feature emerges both in
theoretical (Chaitin 1987) and empirical frameworks (Singley and Anderson,1989), (Cohen
and Bacdayan, 1991), (Egidi, 1993).
Individuals involved in games which require cooperation, after the initial period of
learning, do not memorize the detailed steps of organizational procedures; they do not keep all
knowledge and information they need to play stored in memory, but create and memorize sets
of simple "meta rules" which allow to re-create the organizational routines. These rules are
elementary "Condition-Action" rules (in the standard sense of the cognitive sciences), which
are the result of sub-goals identification, i.e. of a spontaneous division of knowledge among
agents. Agents store in procedural memory these rules, which embody PXWXDO UHODWLRQV and
enable them jointly to recreate the routines at any particular moment.
To summarize some of the previous issues: even if we are still far from being able to
frame the complex problem of knowledge creation and transmission within a unique
theoretical approach, the assumption that procedures are the micro-units of human behaviour
in organizations is strongly confirmed by observations, field research and experiments. They
are partially tacit, opaque and incomplete. The latter property is particularly relevant because
of its consequences on organizational change: the fact that individuals do not usually possess
full knowledge of organizational procedures, but are able to recreate its missing components,
implies that they have the capacity to solve micro-problems autonomously. The problem is
now to clarify the relationship between this kind of micro-innovative activity and top-down
planning and designing managerial activity in order to better understand how organizational
change take place.
4 Organizational learning and the division of knowledge
When managerial decisions are taken in ill-defined and uncertain conditions, one
successful strategy of solution is based on the attempt to decompose the problem to be solved
in sub- problems easier to approach. This procedure, carefully analyzed in 2UJDQL]DWLRQV (7.2.
7KHSURFHVVRILQQRYDWLRQ) is now became a classic approach to problem solving in Artificial
Intelligence. (Newell and Simon (1958) and (1972)).
A well-known feature of this procedure is recursivity: subjects seek to decompose the
problem to be solved into sub-problems which they hope will prove easier for them to handle.
If some of these sub-problems are still too complex, they are in turn decomposed. The
procedure continues recursively until easily solvable sub-problems have been obtained. If
successful, the decomposition procedure structures the original problem into a hierarchy of
inter-related sub-problems.
This procedure is typical of top-down planning activity within organizations; it gives
rise to a recursive division of tasks which, if achieved successfully, can be used by the top
management to give a new shape to the division of labour, knowledge and competences
within an organization.
8This does not mean that the hierarchized structures which perform different but inter-
related tasks within organizations are the outcome of a purely artificial and centralized process
of planning; on the contrary, planning and organizational design can be, to a certain extent,
distributed activities.
It is now convenient to recall the distinction between planning (static planning) and
organizational designing (dynamic planning). In the first case an organizational hierarchy is
supposed to be "given" with a related division of labour and coordination mechanisms ;
individuals, at different hierarchical levels and with different competences, may have
discretionary power in realizing a general plan (top-down planning), or they may actively
propose new solutions, new "local" plans, which are coordinated by means of non-centralized
mechanisms (for example, bottom-up planning). But they formulate their plans according to a
given division of labour.
In the second case the activity is to design new organizational solutions: the problem is
to change the organizational structure, i.e. the division of labour and the coordination
mechanism.
Turning our attention to the first case, note that, even if they operate through strongly
hierarchized structures, organizations in the real world do not require their operational units
merely to execute procedures, or blindly to implement plans meticulously set out by the upper
levels of the hierarchy; on the contrary, within real organizations people continuously modify
procedures and adapt it to external change.
 Therefore, even when planning is a top-down centralized activity, it has a "conjectural"
character, for ERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\ reasons: on the one hand, in fact, the higher levels of the
hierarchy must formulate plans in extremely general and open-ended terms, because the ways
to implement general plans into details are not and cannot be known a-priori and computed ;
on the other, the lower levels do not merely execute perfectly defined and detailed plans in
"mechanical" fashion. Execution of plans requires the ability to interpret and to adapt general
ideas, and to solve problems and conflicts that arise so that these ideas can be implemented.
I now turn to the case of organizational design. As in the previous case, consider a
situation between the two extreme alternatives, respectively the centralized and the distributed
coordination of designing activity. Suppose that the top management puts into place a re-
design of the organization is in order to react to some kind of environmental change. Again,
the implementation of the new division of labour within the organization which is required by
such a change gives rise to a complex process of adaptation which is far from what believed
by the traditional theory of planning: from one hand in fact the implementation of a new
organizational design requires managers and employees to re-think their jobs and revise their
competences; from the other, to be effective, any new design requires local checks and
readjustments, i.e. the resolution of cognitive conflicts arising from the match among the
general requirements of the project and the specific, idiosyncratic knowledge arising from the
personal knowledge of any single agent.
We can conclude that the micro problem solving activity is a fundamental source of
organizational change, which displays his effects also beyond the scope of the individual
activity within organization. Individuals have very incomplete knowledge of the
organizational routines, as we have seen, but they have the ability to recreate the missing parts
of it: they can modify and adapt general plans to specific context or micro-innovate, i.e. find
new local solutions to the problems, whatever their position in the hierarchical pyramid may
be. When applied to organizations, the ability to complete knowledge suggest an explanation
of how organizational procedures develop and change, because allow us to attribute to
individuals a permanent ability to micro innovate and to modify procedures.
9A question implicitly arises from our discussion: why realistic examples of the two
extreme situation of coordination, the fully centralized and the distributed one, are so rare? In
relation to the first case, we have some historical examples in army organizations, where is
easy to see that a fully top-down hierarchized structure is extremely fragile because of its
inability to react to external changing circumstances. In the latter, to my knowledge there are
no historical examples of economic organizations in which the design of new division of
labour is a fully decentralized process ( a "spontaneous", Hayekian organization).
Instead, a clear example of distributed design is provided by the Schumpeterian picture
of "creative destruction", which can be considered as a form of design activity coordinated by
the market. Schumpeter’s analysis starts from the "circular flow" condition, where producers
and consumer are in equilibrium and profits and interest rates are close to zero. These
conditions, which describe approximately the status of the economy during the phase of
depression within the business cycle, provide new opportunities for innovators. They create
new products or new technologies which are "tested" on the market. If the first innovative
wave has successful results, the innovations are adopted by imitators, spread through the
entire economic system and give rise to a phase of prosperity. New skills, new competences
and a new division of labour among firms are created within the economy. At the end of phase
of prosperity the economy exhibit a different division of labour, and a new competences and
skills distribution, as the result of the competition among firms and of selection by market. In
consequence the outcome of the process of creative destruction can be interpreted as being the
result of competition among different projects, undertaken by different rival firms, which are
selected by market mechanisms. By this point of view markets operate as a distributed
mechanism of project and design coordination.
This phenomenon has many analogies with the organizational learning process which
takes place inside firms, and therefore may be interesting to emphasize the differences and try
to explain their nature.
The most relevant difference regards the relationship between cooperation and
competition. Schumpeter focuses his attention much more narrowly on the rivalry among
firms producing similar goods using different technologies than on the effects of innovation
on vertical integration, which presupposes cooperation among firms. This point has been
analyzed by Williamson in his description of "the fundamental transformation" (Williamson
1985) . Within organization, on the contrary, a high amount of cooperation, based on common
knowledge and competence overlapping, is needed to realize new projects: therefore the
problem is how the internal relationship must be designed to mediate between the need to
maintain a certain degree of rivalry among employees and the need to encourage their
collaboration.
Imagine that employees and managers possess - to different extents - the capacities of
autonomy and creativity which Schumpeter attributes to entrepreneurs. The problem is why
there are not examples of modern business organization where the design of new division of
labour is a fully decentralized process, and employees do have full and autonomous capacity
to innovate: this lead us to wonder which relationship exist among authority, decentralisation
and control within organization. I will recall some aspects of the problem in the next
paragraph, by discussing the relationship between New Institutionalist’s and Simon’s approach
to employment relationship.
I shall not further discuss the features of organizational learning here: the reader is
referred to the literature, and in particular to the wide range of works collected in ’HFLVLRQV
DQG2UJDQL]DWLRQV by J. March (1988). I limit myself to note that, when considered in its
connections with the process of division of labour, the notion of coordination takes a different
meaning from the one implicit in neoclassical economics. For the latter coordination means
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making individual and independent decisions compatible, here instead the problem of
coordination concerns the relationship between the top-down activity to design new
organizational set-ups and the adaptive, intelligent bottom-up reactions by managers and
employees, which should give rise to a better adaptation of the organization to the external
environment.
5 Opportunism and loyalty: feed back mechanisms for adjustment.
In order to define and achieve its goals in an open environment, an organization must be
able to redefine its internal tasks, and therefore its internal division of labour. Learning, as the
adaptation of the organization to changing conditions in the external environment, thus give
rise to an internal reorganization undertaken in order to pursue pre-established goals more
successfully. As we have seen, this process cannot be rigidly hierarchical ; but on the opposite
side, we have no evidence of economic organizations characterized by a fully decentralized
process of organizational designing. A key point to focus why the extreme case of centralized
and decentralized designing are not working is howcompetition and cooperation mechanism
works to guarantee the creation and constant exchange of information and knowledge within
organization. The classical feature of knowledge is his partial inappropriability and the
impossibility to evaluate it a priori. Within organizations, by consequence, to evaluate the
individual contribution to the achievement of a common goals is a very uncertain and "fuzzy"
task. In addition, the division of labour and competences give rise to a strong asymmetry of
information and knowledge within organization, and by consequence there is room for
opportunistic behaviour and shirking to arise.
In the framework of the so-called New Institutional Economics, to prevent shirking,
"principals" must design incentive contracts in such a way that the interest of the firm and the
self-interest of the "agent" are made to coincide - to a degree.
In contrast with this view, based on the idea to control opportunistic behaviours, let me
recall H. Simon’ approach, based on the "identification" principle.
Simon claims that the employee enters the firm on the understanding that he will receive
a salary in return for willingness to accept authority. Consequently, Simon maintains that
enforcement of employment contracts does not present any particular difficulty. In his view,
the key element in an organization is the loyalty of its employees.
Let us briefly examine the boundaries between loyalty and opportunism, and compare
New Institutional and Simon’s approach on this point. If identification exists, the employee
who works loyally must not be frustrated in his expectations: therefore the organization must
be able to discover able and creative employees and it must also be able to enhance their
abilities. Now, what are the typical features of this kind of employee?
If the organization must be flexible, able to learn and to adapt, the most important
quality of its employees is QRW blind obedience to authority but instead the ability to critically
and autonomously evaluate new problems, and the ability to deal with disagreements with
superiors; this is the typical case of "voice" as analyzed by Hirschman.(1970)
Thus the following abilities are vital to an innovative organization: a high propensity to
evaluate autonomously new situations (solve and frame problems), and a high propensity to
resort to the "voice" option when conflicting solutions, or opinions arise in a context of
loyalty.
 Let me add two qualifications to Simon’s analysis of the employment relation: first,
employees must not only be able to perform a set of tasks but they must be able to learn how
to perform new and unexpected tasks. Secondly, although it is true that employees accept
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authority in exchange for wages, such acceptance must be conditioned and active in the sense
of the "voice" option. The organization, for its part, must exercise its authority in such a way
that it leaves discretionary margins for decision making by its subordinates so that conflicts of
opinion can be resolved by allowing the most competent opinion to prevail, thereby
reinforcing the identification mechanism.
I wish to conclude the paragraph with brief discussion of the limits which creative and
loyal behaviour may encounter within organizations and therefore the risk that efficient and
dynamic organization may lapse into inefficiency or decline. What follows does not pretend to
be an exhaustive analysis; it is only a brief sketch based on the points discussed above.
Consider the situations that may arise in the case of decisional conflict between
subordinates and their superiors and when authority is blindly enforced.
In many situations, employees have more specific knowledge of the situation, can
evaluate it more carefully then the controller, or are simply better able to frame and solve the
problems which arise in ongoing activity. Therefore, if contracts require the blind acceptance
of authority in exchange for wages, when disagreement arises over how to perform a given
task between an employee and his principal, the conflicting opinions have neither room nor
solution. Intelligent employees realize that trying to use the "voice" option will be
unsuccessful and that they must therefore accept stupid orders. ( thereby being frustrated).
In turn, a mediocre principal will prefer blind obedience to voice, and will try to avoid
conflicting situations which could reveal his incompetence. He therefore has a strong
incentive to reduce the area of common knowledge and competence between himself and
employees.
A similar result arises from the behaviour of inefficient employees, who risk being
discovered and punished, or perhaps dismissed. Therefore if an employee chooses the
opportunistic strategy of minimizing his effort to reach a high standard of ability and
competence, and therefore has low competence, then he has a strong incentive to avoid being
discovered and will try to evade control by his superiors.
He can do this by using the same strategy as the incompetent supervisor: reducing the
area of common knowledge and competence. In situations of a potential conflict of opinions,
he will blindly follow orders. Therefore his principal will not receive useful feed-back on the
decisions he has taken.
Thus, on the one hand we have agents who try to avoid control; on the other, principals
who do not accept discussion: Both form a group within the hierarchy, a hidden group of
mediocre employees who can survive if they are able to increase informational asymmetry or -
which is the same thing - reduce the common knowledge area in order to protect themselves.
Similar kinds of second-best employees exist at every hierarchical level.
If this group fails to reduce or to avoid controls and disagreements, it cannot expand,
and it will survive as a marginal "error" in the process of organizational learning and
adaptation: in this case, at any moment, skilful subordinates can challenge incompetent
superiors, and able superiors can discover the errors of mediocre employees. Thus an efficient
organization applies pressure - and in certain cases also moral pressure - on slack employees
and managers. This depicts a possible "virtuous" circle.
Yet the organization may also lapse into decline. As long as the size of the organization
increases - despite its internal inefficiency - the dimension of the hidden group expands.
Therefore if the hidden group has protected itself satisfactorily, the situation is opaque and it
is difficult to detect the causes of and those responsible for inefficiencies. Creative
competition thus becomes a very inconvenient way to reach a top position because there is a
safe, alternative strategy: joining the second-best group.
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Therefore skilful employees may also be tempted to adopt the opportunistic strategy ;
advancements, in fact, depend on affiliation and obedience, not on skills, results and
managerial ability. Opportunism may spread if the expression of voice and loyalty are
systematically frustrated. This gives rise to a strong reduction of the areas of common
knowledge between employees and managers and therefore reduces the organization’s ability
to react to errors and adapt to change. Hence if blind obedience to the authority principle
prevails over voice, the organization may decline into a bureaucratic and inefficient hierarchy.
A vicious circle is thus established.
6 Final Remarks: virtuous and adverse selection within organizations.
Summing up, within organizations the virtuous mechanism of competitive selection
does not have robust self-enforcing characteristics; under certain conditions, it can be
overwhelmed by a mechanism of adverse selection, which can lead the organization toward a
very sub-optimal "order" characterized by a strongly authoritarian and scarcely competent
hierarchy. The reasons why an adverse selection process can arise have been briefly suggested
above: if the area of common knowledge among individuals involved in the realization of a
set of common tasks is very restricted, there is room neither for reciprocal control and the
prevention of shirking nor for exploiting the positive externalities which follow the emergence
of creative behaviour. A tayloristic division of labour, with a rigid separation of competences
and a minimization of the common knowledge area among individuals, only apparently
simplifies individual activities within the organization: in reality this configuration prevent the
working of the most important communication channels among individuals, and therefore
prevent the changes from occurring.
The micro roots of this phenomenon have been clearly evidenced by a large set of
experimental results in the cognitive sciences: in particular, as we have seen, the transfer of
cognitive skills is limited and requires effort, and organizational routines are partially opaque
to individuals.
 The fact that individuals have incomplete knowledge of the routines involved in their
everyday activity, has a twofold consequence: on the one hand, they can complete it either by
recreating its missing components or by modifying it, and therefore even during the execution
of standard routines the ability to re-create missing parts is a continuous source for potential
micro-innovations.
On the other hand the boundaries among different competences and skills cannot be
extremely net and clear, and an overlapping competence area is needed. The smaller the
overlapping competence areas among individuals within an organization, as in the tayloristic
division of labour, the higher the cognitive effort required to cooperate for the fulfilment of a
common goal. Consequently, because of a restriction of the common knowledge and
competence area, the relationship among individuals become more opaque, and their ability to
evaluate the each other’s competence and actions is strongly reduced. Now, the difficulty of
evaluating the quality and the uses of goods (Akerlof, 1970) is the most important reason
which give rise to the adverse selection on the markets. The similarities are clear: exactly as
happens in markets, where the areas of competence among consumers and producers of a
good are totally separated and by consequence consumers cannot fully evaluate goods, within
tayloristic organizations individuals encounter major difficulties in evaluating the products
and the performances of their colleagues (superiors or subordinates). These difficulties, in a
organizational context where the common competence area is too restricted, are therefore the
main source of opportunistic behaviours.
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In order to reinforce loyalty and identification, individuals (employees and managers)
must be rewarded by the mechanism of competitive selection. The organizational design, apart
from the awareness of the designers, is therefore crucial to determine the virtuous working of
the mechanism of competitive selection, since it may allow a transparent common cognitive
area to arise. Only on this basis conflicts of opinion (and of interests) can be resolved with the
prevalence of the most competent opinion, the identification mechanism can be reinforced and
can loyalty overcome opportunism.
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